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7GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
DEFAULT PENALTIES
NUNO GOUVEIA1
Abstract. We introduce a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and incom-
plete ﬁnancial markets, where default is allowed and agents face in case they do default an utility
penalty, which is their own private information. In this setting, if agents have heterogeneous
characteristics they will generally pay diﬀerent returns on any given asset, and thus the same
promise made by diﬀerent agents is in fact not equivalent. If asset trading is anonymous, then
the same price is paid for promises whose value can be in fact quite diﬀerent, and very severe
adverse selection problems may arise as consequence. We thus incorporate in the above model
an alternative way to negotiate the ﬁnancial assets, under which an equilibrium exists and the
adverse selection problem is mitigated. Succinctly, consumers trade assets non-anonymously
with a set of ﬁnancial intermediaries not allowed to default.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. In the literature on general equilibrium theory under uncertainty, a growing
attention has been given in recent years to issues such as the possibility of default in the payment
of asset returns, or the existence of asymmetric information about the value of asset returns.
These two distinct lines of research have been dissociated one from another, but one can conceive
situations where a borrower is allowed to default and knows better than the lender what will be his
or her future default level. Concretely, when default is allowed, we need some sort of mechanism to
guarantee that borrowers will optimally choose to repay some positive amount in equilibrium, since
otherwise nobody would buy assets. In the literature there are three basic types of assumptions
made to enforce a positive level of payment: (i) the existence in the economy of some durable good
that can serve as collateral and that can be seized if the debtor defaults, (see Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Zame [9], for example), (ii) the existence of a default penalty in each debtor’s utility function
(usually proportional to the level of default), which would reﬂect a pain of conscience from not
keeping his or her promises, or the cost of social disapproval, or still the loss in utility caused by
the enforcement of legal sanctions such as a sentence convicting the defaulter to some time in jail










































(see for example Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [8]), or (iii) an hybrid combination of the last
two assumptions, in which debtors suﬀer a penalty relative to the value of default not covered by
the collateral (see again for example Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [8]). The introduction of
collateral, for instance, can be very advantageous, since it allows for example to guarantee existence
of equilibrium in an economy with incomplete markets and inﬁnite horizon (see Ara´ ujo, P´ ascoa
and Torres-Mart´ ınez [6]).
When we introduce default penalties, it seems reasonable to assume that their level is private
information of each borrower, and that lenders do not observe them. In the existing models with
asymmetric information relative to future asset returns, the usual approach is to consider that
assets are traded anonymously and/or pooled together. The drawback with this approach is that
the asset price will reﬂect an expected average repayment rate, so it will be relatively low for
sellers with high repayment rates, and vice-versa. This may possibly lead to the vanishing of asset
markets, exactly in the same fashion as in Akerlof’s [1] lemons model.
To make the introduction of non-anonymous bilateral negotiation worthwhile
1, it must incorpo-
rate some sort of signaling mechanism. In order to get an equilibrium existence result, this signaling
mechanism cannot be too complex. The signaling mechanism introduced in our model will be the
simplest one could imagine: the buyer asks the sellers how much they want to borrow, before ﬁxing
a price for the asset. This will be revealing because the lower an agent’s default penalties are, the
more assets he or she will want to sell at any given price. Although he or she will be making the
announcement before the buyer names a price, he or she does so with a given expectation he or
she forms about this price, which must be correct in equilibrium. The buyer in turn, will have a
strategy such that the more an agent announces he or she wants to borrow, the lower the price he
or she will set. If this strategy function is suﬃciently steep, it is possible that even the types with
lower default penalties will prefer to borrow a small amount. In equilibrium the asset price and
the expected repayment rate will be higher when the asset is negotiated according to this simple
signaling mechanism
2 3.
One may wonder which type of incentive compatibility constraints will the buyers have to
satisfy such that the sellers’ announcements disclose some useful information about their type. In
the particular setting we will adopt we will not need such constraints. Suppose that the number
of consumers is very large (but ﬁnite, to keep things relatively simple), and that they can be
separated in a relatively small number of groups with similar characteristics, including the default
penalties they face. Then, a buyer can perfectly choose the same price for the assets sold by all
these homogeneous consumers, and since each one is relatively small in comparison with the size of
the group with characteristics alike, the particular announcement he or she makes can be assumed
to have no impact in the price he or she will receive, such that each and every one of them will
act as a price-taker. Then, the announcement they will make will simply be the optimal choice
given the (constant) price they expect to pay. To have a term of comparison, we will also analyze
what happens when buyers name prices before and then sellers choose quantities. In this case
there is no signal to the buyers until the moment they have to form a price (or a return), and so
their decision will be the same to every type. As it is easy to guess, this negotiation process will
yield very similar results to those of a situation where assets are traded anonymously or pooled
together. Also, in this case we do not seem to be able to ﬁnd an equilibrium existence result, due
to a non-convexity in the asset buyers’ problem.
The introduction of a monopolistic component in the model is aimed precisely at counter weight-
ing the negative eﬀect of the information asymmetry. I drew this idea from partial equilibrium
literature, where very often the solution to improve on the gains from a bilateral negotiation passes
1We assume that the costs of bilateral negotiation are null.
2Also because when the types with lower penalties get less indebted their optimal repayment rates go up.
3If the default penalties are state-dependent the announcement sellers make will never fully uncover their true








































7General Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information And Default Penalties 3
by giving to the part which can be hurt the most the negotiation power. In this kind of literature
the message is that an ”anomaly”, so to speak, can be compensated by another ’anomaly’ in order
to drive the equilibrium to a superior outcome. And I think that if this is idea holds in many partial
equilibrium models, why shouldn’t it also hold in general equilibrium models; this papers’ main
messages has two parts that cannot be dissociated: the introduction of bilateral negotiation as
opposed to anonymous negotiation can improve on the outcome, but only if suﬃcient negotiation
power is given to the part which has no private information.
The present model will have some resemblance with the models in either Ara´ ujo, Orrillo e
P´ ascoa [4] and Ara´ ujo, Fajardo e P´ ascoa [2]. The main diﬀerence between those models and the
one presented in this paper is that there we have the presence of some spread functionals that
allow the consumers to compute the price they will receive from their sales of assets depending
on the amount of collateral they put up to back the promises they make, while here they will
face diﬀerent prices for their short sales simply in function of their identity. This paper has also
in this aspect a close similitude with Bisin and Gottardi [7], where they ﬁrst introduced ﬁnancial
intermediaries who charge bid-ask spreads, and show that this limits the gains that traders can
obtain using their informational advantage over the agents in the other side of the market, thus
leading to an existence of equilibrium result.
1.2. Summary. The economic structure is fully described in detail in section 2. In section 3 we
study the equilibrium properties regarding adverse selection problems, and argue that if indexed
assets are negotiated in a certain manner that may lead agents to disclose some of their private
information (that is, with the signaling mechanism already discussed above), these problems can
be lessened and economic eﬃciency can thus be increased. In section 4 the existence of such
equilibrium is established. Finally, in the appendix, the optimization problem of the consumers
and the ﬁnancial intermediaries is given close attention.
2. Model Structure
2.1. Basic Framework. In the real world, individuals do not generally trade assets directly with
each other. Most often they trade assets with a relatively small number of ﬁnancial institutions
and ﬁnancial intermediaries. Also very often the assets they can purchase are diﬀerent from the
ones they can sell. The returns in each side of the market will not be in general equal, although
correlated. Because there is great concern about bank failures in modern societies, it seems natural
that the ﬁnancial intermediaries may suﬀer a signiﬁcantly higher default sanction in case of default
than a consumer. We will take this to an extreme by assuming that the ﬁnancial intermediaries
in our model face an inﬁnite default penalty in every state of nature. So, we will consider a two
period economy with uncertainty, where there are two types of assets and two types of traders.
The traders are divided between consumers (or agents) and ﬁnancial intermediaries, which we
will call bankers. The assets are divided between primitive assets, which promise to pay a given
non-negative, state contingent, amount in the second period, and indexed assets whose promised
returns in each state are a weighted average of the primitive assets promised returns in that state.
Only bankers are allowed to sell the primitive assets, and only consumers are allowed to sell the
indexed assets; bankers are also allowed to buy both types of assets, but consumers can only buy
primitives. Consumers thus cannot trade directly between them in the ﬁnancial markets. Indexed
assets will be sold at a discount price: their price will be assumed to be equal to the weighted
average of the primitive asset prices, minus a certain spread. Primitive assets are standardized and
non-exclusive; indexed assets are non-standardized, as the spread may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
pairs of buyers and sellers. Agents are allowed to default, but they suﬀer a subjective default
penalty in their utility; bankers are not allowed to do so. Agents have private information about
their subjective default penalties.
Our notation and assumptions are the following:









































S = {1,...,S} the set of states of nature in period 1. We take S = {0} ∪ S.
H = {1,...,H} the set of consumers.
B = {1,...,B} the set of bankers.
L = {1,...,L} the set of consumption goods.
wh
s ∈ RL
++ the endowment of consumer h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.
wb
s ∈ RL
++ the endowment of banker b ∈ B in state s ∈ S.
xh
s ∈ RL
+ the consumption bundle of consumer h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.
xb
s ∈ R+ the consumption bundle of banker b ∈ B in state s ∈ S.
psl ∈ R+ the price in units of account of commodity l ∈ L in state s ∈ S
P = {1,...,P} the set of (linearly independent) primitive assets, P 6 S.
q ∈ R+ the price in units of account of primitive asset p ∈ P.
ap
s ∈ R+ the return of primitive asset p in state s ∈ S.
φh
p ∈ R+ the purchases of primitive asset p ∈ P by agent h ∈ H.
ϕb
p ∈ R the purchases of primitive asset p ∈ P by banker b ∈ B.
ψb
h ∈ R+ the quantity of indexed asset sold by agent h ∈ H banker b ∈ B.




s the return promised by the indexed asset b, where As = (ap
s)p∈P .
γb
h the spread asked by banker b ∈ B to agent h ∈ H for the purchase of one unit of indexed




the price in units of account of each unit of indexed asset b ∈ B.
θh















s → [0,1] the probability distribution of λh
s,
The weights vectors δb are exogenous: each diﬀerent banker b is allowed to trade only assets
indexed to the returns of a speciﬁc portfolio with weights vector δb, where we assume that δb 6= δb
0
,
for every b 6= b0.5 6
We assume that bankers consume only one commodity, which we can take, without loss of
generality, to be good l = 1. One interpretation is that bankers are art lovers whose utility only
depends on the number of rare paintings they purchase, or that they only care about the amount
of gold they accumulate. The objective is to model bankers as real proﬁt maximizers, the proﬁt
being measured by the quantity they can purchase of a speciﬁc commodity.
We consider two possible negotiation rules for the spreads γb
h: (i) γb
h is chosen by the bankers and
then agents choose ψb
h (hereafter rule I)7 8, or (ii) bankers ﬁrst ask each agent to choose ψb
h, before
4One might wonder if we do not need to impose some rule determining how an agent who owes two diﬀerent
bankers should split his payments between them in case he defaults. We will assume that the agent has to pay to
every banker in proportion to the value of their claims. In this way he or she would be legally forbidden to favor any
banker in prejudice of the rest. This hypothesis also allows us to assume that the default penalties are independent
from b.
5Thus, if B 6 S each banker demands to its debtors a vector of returns linearly independent from those of all
his competitors. This means that if B < S we are thus introducing an element of monopolistic competition in the
model. This hypothesis will be in many cases paradoxically convenient in terms of eﬃciency, since it gives some
degree of market power to the less informed players in the economy.
6We are thus introducing an element of monopolistic competition in the model. This hypothesis will be in many
cases paradoxically convenient in terms of eﬃciency, since it gives some degree of market power to the less informed
players in the economy.
7The ﬁrst rule is intended to parallel models with anonymous negotiation. In the later an asset buyers’ best
guess about the future repayment rate is an average across all individuals in the economy, in this model and under
rule I the asset buyers best guess is an average across all types an agent can have.
8Note that this negotiation rule is equivalent to one in which bankers and agents announce their respective
choices about spreads and borrowings simultaneously, since agents will be able to predict exactly each banker’s








































7General Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information And Default Penalties 5
setting the spreads (hereafter rule II).9 In this paper we establish the existence of equilibrium
when indexed assets are negotiated according to rule II, but we are (apparently) unable to do the
same regarding rule I (see lemma 4.2 and footnote 31 on page 14). But in section 3 we argue and
provide an example showing that rule II can be anyway superior to rule I in terms of eﬃciency.10
The basic set of relationships can be depicted in the following two ﬁgures, the ﬁrst one for period
0 and the second one for period 1.11 The thick white arrows represent unit of account ﬂows, the
thick grey arrows represent asset ﬂows, and the thin black lines represent commodity ﬂows.
Insert ﬁgure 1 here.
Insert ﬁgure 2 here.
Note that no assumption is made about if markets are complete. We may either have P = S or
P < S. But the important thing to have in mind is that since agents face a diﬀerence in the price
of primitive and indexed assets, even if we have P = S it may be very costly for them to fully span





is very close (or even
equal) to zero.
2.2. Agent Types. Agents’ choice will depend on their S marginal disutilities λh
s. An agent’s









is, a random variable with domain in Λh = Λh
1 ×...×Λh
S. We assume that σh
s(λh
s) may be correlated
across diﬀerent agents for each s ∈ S.
2.3. Uncertainty. In this model there is not only uncertainty about the state of nature in period
1, but also doubt about the entire matrix
 
λh
h∈H, and their induced future deliveries. Since
bankers only care about consumption of good 1 while agents mind about the L commodities





h∈H are, the higher the equilibrium relative
prices of goods l = 2,..,L will be in terms of good 1. In this model, prediction also involves
trying to ﬁgure out what will be the agents’ default rates, and by this means, what will be the
relative price vector in each state. Moreover, this reasoning goes a little deeper: default rates
are themselves inﬂuenced by the relative prices since these determine the real value of consumers
endowments, asset revenues and debts, and all these factors inﬂuence consumers’ optimal level of
deliveries. Default penalties and future expected relative prices also inﬂuence how much consumers
will want to consume, borrow, and lend in period 0 for any given period 0 price vector, implying
that ﬁrst period equilibrium variables depend also on default penalties.
Since equilibrium prices depend on λ, their observation can disclose some information about the
true matrix λ. We can make diﬀerent assumptions about the way in which the bankers take infor-
mation out of prices. We may assume that they do not have the necessary sophistication and skills
to perform such heavy computations12. Or we may consider, at the extreme opposite, that they
can at no cost restrain their beliefs about the true value of λ to the set Λ(y0) = {λ : y0 ∈ Y0(λ)},
where y0 ≡ (p0,q) and Y0(λ) is the set of period 0 equilibrium price vectors y0 consistent with the
matrix λ.13 The ﬁrst assumption leads us to the concept of a Walrasian Equilibrium, while the
second one is in line with the notion of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium, as ﬁrst introduced by
9For a discussion on the diﬀerent inplications of these two rules, refer to section 3.
10Although it is conceivable that in some situations the worst payers would be better of under rule I, expecially
when they have a low probability.
11Again, note that we are allowing bankers to both buy and sell primitive assets, while agents are forbidden
from selling them short. Hence when a banker buys a primitive, it must be buying it from another banker. This can
be seen as the functioning of a inter-banking monetary market, where ﬁnancial intermediaries with lack of liquidity
borrow from fellows with excess liquidity.
12Or that they do have but the cost is too high, or even that they are simply too time consuming and cannot
be performed in useful time.
13Note that we do not assume that they extract information from second period price vectors. In period 1 there









































Radner [11]. Fortunately, our setting will be general enough to embrace these two diﬀerent notions
of equilibrium.






expectations about λ after observing prices will be denoted by σ(λ|y0), and if we assume that they
extract no information from prices, this will simply be independent from y0. In the case of agents,
they already know their own type, so we replace σ(λ|y0) by σ(λ|y0,λh).
2.4. Optimization Problems.
2.4.1. Agents.
2.4.2. Utility Functions. We assume that each agent has a von-Neumman-Morgenstern utility func-



















14, and where Dh
s ∈ R+ is his or her level of default in state s, in units
of account. Each agent h gives a subjective probability αh




























2.4.3. Budget Constraints. The set of budget constraints in period 0 of agent h is given by
(2.1) p0xh










From now on we will assume that (p0,q) ∈ ∆L+P−1. 15




















h is the amount of resources that he







From now on we assume that ps(λ) ∈ ∆L−1, ∀s ∈ S, ∀λ ∈ Λ. The constraints (2.3) and (2.4) are













14Here, consumption bundles and default levels are not presented as functions of agent types and spreads proposed
by bankers; this dependency results only from utility maximization.
15Note that the assumption that δb ∈ int∆P−1, together with wh
0  0, guarantees that 2.1 has an interior point,
by choosing ψb
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Although the ﬁrst representation is more elegant, the second is technically more convenient to
establish the upper semicontinuity of the agents’ best response correspondences. But after that we
simply take θh







and proceed with the ﬁrst representation.
2.4.4. Bankers.
2.4.5. Utility Functions. Bankers have von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions depending only
on consumption of commodity 1, and have inﬁnite default utility penalties. Each banker b gives
a subjective probability βb
s > 0 to state s, with
P
s∈S βb
s = 1. Thus, banker b expected utility










s1) if Dbe = 0





s is the banker’s expected default. Notice that if a given banker b attributes
a subjective probability equal to zero to some state s, then we could have this banker planning to
default in that state. To be consistent with the hypothesis of an inﬁnite default penalty we must
impose that βb
s > 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀b ∈ B. This is simply a prudential assumption.16
2.4.6. Budget Constraints. In the ﬁrst period, banker’s b budget constraint is
(2.7) p01xb







His constraint for a given state s ∈ S and matrix λ is17
(2.8) ps1(λ)xb
s1(λ) 6 ps(λ)wb








2.5.1. Agents. If we consider rule I agents make their decisions only after observing the spreads
set by the bankers, and always given the relative price vectors he or she expects to face. So,
a strategy under rule I for type λh must be a function of the vectors γh = (γbh)b∈B, y0, and
p1 ≡ {p1s (λN)}
λN∈ΛN
s∈S . It will depend on y0 not only because y0 aﬀects directly his optimal plan,
but also its observation may change the expectation about p1, by disclosing some information
about the matrix λ−h.
If rule II is considered instead, agents no longer observe spreads before taking their period 0
decisions, but they do so with a given expectation about what these spreads will be, and this
expectation has to be correct in any Nash equilibrium. So, the only diﬀerence in the deﬁnition of
an agent’s strategy under rules I and II is that in rule II the observed spread vector γh is replaced
by an expected spread vector γe
h.
16The only hypothesis about bankers’ preferences towards risk we must postulate is that they cannot be risk-
lovers. In the proof of proposition 1 below we need to assume that the bankers preferences are convex, but not
necessarily strictly so. We can either assume that a banker is risk-averse or risk-neutral. The fact that the bankers
face an inﬁnite default penalty is suﬃcient to guarantee that they do not take excessive risk even if they are
risk-neutrals, because they must be able to fully pay their debts with probability one.
17In each period the banker will sell the endowment he or she has of commodities l = 2,...,L, since they do
not enter in his or her utility function, and will buy or sell commodity 1. We need to have wb
sl > 0, ∀s ∈ S,
∀l ∈ L, to guarantee that constraints (2.7) and (2.8) have always an interior point (note that q can be equal to















































































h,y0)(λh) denote the mapping that assigns to each λh ∈ Λh the corresponding strat-
egy Φλh(γe




h,y0)(λh)dσh(λh|y0), where σh = Πs∈Sσh
s. This includes the expected
consumption plan xhe =
R
Λh xh(γe


















these functions must maximize the expected utility function of each agent, and in order for a banker
to be able to derive these expectations he or she must know, besides the distributions σs(λs), the
utility function of each agent, their endowments in each period and in each state, and must have
the necessary sophistication to solve their problem and thus obtain the above integrals.19 20
Remark 2.1. Although the bankers are modeled as a sort of competitive monopolists, their
problem is more complicated than simply taking consumers’ demand functions as given; since they
depend on parameters which are random from the banker’s point of view, the banker has monopoly
power on markets where he simply takes as given expected demand functions. In this model, the
role of rule II will be preciselly to disclose some information about the true demand functions.
2.5.2. Bankers. Banker’s choice variables are his or her consumption in period 0 and in each state
of period 1, his or her portfolio of primitive assets, and the spreads to ask to each agent. But if we
want to model them as proﬁt maximizers in terms of commodity 1, it makes more sense to take
only ϕb and γb as his (ﬁnancial) decision variables, and simply let his consumption in each state





















A strategy for banker b must specify the value of his or her decision variables for each vec-











If we consider rule II the banker’s strategy must depend also on the agents announcements of their
borrowing requirements, ψb ∈ RH






18To be deﬁned below, in section 2.6.
19We are assuming that the bankers know the agent’s entire utility function, except for a single vector of
parameters. This may sound unreasonable, but if the banker’s lack of knowledge were deeper the asymmetric
information problem would be even more complex, and probably unmanageable. But the consumers’ taste for a
certain consumption good can many times be accurately anticipated in real life, so this assumption can have some
reasonability.
20In deriving these functions, it is implicit the use of an expected price vector. If the agents’ expected price
vector diﬀers from the bankers’ expected price vector, the functions derived by the bankers would be diﬀerent from
the true functions Φλh. Since in equilibrium the players’ expectations must be correct, this problem will not stand
in equilibrium. The same applies for the expected spread vector γe
h.
21Since it not only can disclose some private information, but also because it inﬂuences the agent’s optimal








































7General Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information And Default Penalties 9
: ∆L+P−1 × R(B−1)H × RH
+ → RP × RH.





, a family of functions {Φh}h∈H , indicating the strategies of all agents, and
a family of functions {Φb}b∈B indicating the strategies of each one of the B bankers, satisfying





, and their budget constraints.
b) each banker’s b strategy maximize Φb his or her utility, given all other bankers’ strategies,
the strategies of all agents {Φh}
H




, and his or her budget
constraints.
































s,∀s ∈ S; a.e. λ ∈ Λ







We do not need to impose market-clearing in the indexed asset market, since bankers do not
choose quantities to buy.
3. Adverse Selection and the Second Negotiation Rule
The equilibrium, whose existence under rule II is demonstrated in section 4, exhibits adverse
selection symptoms. From the formal analysis in the Appendix, we can see in the agents’ ﬁrst order
conditions (equation (5.2)) that the higher the default penalties are the less the agent will borrow.
When λh




to zero is necessary to increase µ0, the
period 0 income marginal utility, and to decrease µs, the state s income marginal utility, for each
s ∈ S, and this can only be done by transferring some income from period 0 to period 1, while
borrowing does the reverse role. The eﬀective cost of credit can be broken in two components: the
deliveries that the agent decide to make, and the penalty he suﬀers against his default. At the
optimal solution the agent will balance these two costs; if the default penalty becomes lower in
one state the total cost of borrowing is now smaller if it is optimal to default in that state, and
remains unchanged otherwise.
It is also shown in the appendix (remark 5.1) that ψb
h is decreasing in γb
h, as natural. We also




































which is higher in absolute value the higher each λh
s is, not only because of their direct eﬀect, but
also because a higher λh
s leads to a higher repayment rate and smaller consumption in state s, and
thus a to higher income marginal utility µs. The fundamental inference is that agents with higher
default penalties are more responsive to changes in γb
h. This is natural, since when λh
s is lower the
agent becomes less worried about paying the future returns, and thus more willing to borrow even
at a lower indexed asset price q − γb
h. So we have the following picture:









































where we are assuming for graphical simplicity that λh
1 = λh
2 = ... = λh
S = λh. The higher λh is,
the lower the supply of indexed assets to banker b, for any ﬁxed value of γb
h, and the higher the
reduction in ψh when γb
h increases from γb0
h to γb00
h .
This indexed asset supply behavior has very important implications. A banker would like to
have some way to limit the value of ψb
h chosen by the worst types, but the only mechanism available
in our setting is the choice of γb
h. He could achieve this goal by asking a suﬃciently high spread.
But this would decrease more than proportionally the value of ψb
h for the types with higher default
penalties, which is already comparatively low. So, by asking higher spreads the banker will be
driving the best types away from dealing with him, constraining himself to trade indexed assets
only with the ”not so good” types. And he or she could react to this by increasing γb
h even further,
with the consequence that only the worst amongst the worst types would still be interested in
selling assets. The result of this process could be, in the limit, and if such a process is unchained
for all pairs banker-consumer, the vanishing of the indexed asset markets. And if the indexed
assets market disappears, the level of trade in the primitive asset markets will also be reduced.
This adverse selection problem is also likely to arise in models where asset markets are anony-
mous. The reason is that the asset price will reﬂect an average default rate, so that agents that
intend to have a high repayment rate may consider the price too low and decide not to sell the
asset. That would worsen the expected default rate, leading to an increase in the asset price,
unchaining the same kind of market vanishing process.
In this particular model, asymmetric information has a negative eﬀect, even if asset markets
do not vanish. Since agents cannot short-sell primitive assets, even if the number of primitive
assets satisﬁes P = S, a consumer seen by bankers as being to risky may not be able to choose an
asset portfolio that fully spans RS, because he could face spreads very close to q (or even equal),
rendering high transfers of income from period 1 to period 0 unfeasible or non-optimal for him.22
So, a main issue that should be addressed when asymmetric information is present is to devise
some sort of mechanism that could mitigate these adverse selection distortions. In our setting, if
bankers could impose a limit κb
h on ψh, ﬁgure 3 would change to
Insert ﬁgure 4 here.
κb
h would serve to explicitly limit the short sales of the types with lower default penalties, while
at the same time a lower γb
h could induce the types with higher default penalties to increase ψb
h.
But we are unable to guarantee that such an equilibrium exists, since bankers now would have the
ability to simultaneously determine the price and explicitly inﬂuence the quantity traded. This
would introduce a non-convexity in each banker’s strategy set, and the only way we could try to go
around this would be introducing a continuum of bankers (which would not make much economic
sense), but without success. The intuitive reason is that agents do not care about the expected
value of the spreads that each banker propose to them; what matters to agents is which banker
represents the less costly ﬁnancing opportunity. Our hope would be to use a puriﬁcation technique
similar to the one used in Ara´ ujo, Orrillo and P´ ascoa [4] or Ara´ ujo and P´ ascoa [5], but the agents’
problems in this case will not depend on the bankers’ mixed strategies proﬁle only through a ﬁnite
number of expected values, so no puriﬁcation technique seems feasible.
Nonetheless, bankers can inﬂuence the quantity traded, but only implicitly, if they use rule II.
If the banker’s strategy where to ask higher spreads when the announced values of ψb
h are also
22This could be seen as an argument in favor of less pungent default penalties, the fact that default may help
agents to obtain full insurance more easily, but at the same time one of the reasons for the spread being too high may
be the fact that the agent has a low default penalty with high probability. The other reason may be the imperfect
competition that exist between the bankers in the choice of spreads. But if the indexants for distinct bankers are
not very diﬀerent, that is, if δb ≈ δb0
for each b 6= b0, then the spread will tend to be close to zero if the bankers
look at the agents as being reliable debtors, because competition will then be relatively intense (the gain in market
share from a certain decrease in the asked spread will be signiﬁcant) leading the demanded price to be closer to the








































7General Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information And Default Penalties 11
higher, then the agents, anticipating the optimal strategy for the bankers might prefer to choose
a lower ψb
h to beneﬁt from a lower spread. A main diﬀerence between the two negotiation rules
is that in the ﬁrst one spreads are independent from the quantities traded, since they are chosen
before, while in the second rule they are not. Rule II displays yet another interesting feature, which
is concomitant with the previous one and reinforces it: the announcement of ψb
h may disclose some
new information about the type of agent h. Since bankers know the agents’ entire utility functions
and endowments except the default penalties, and are able to derive their optimal solution for
each vector λh ∈ Λh, bankers could infer from the observation of the optimal choices ψb
h something
about the true value of λh.
Since no incentive compatibility constraints are introduced in the bankers’ problem, agents could
try to mislead them by choosing a ψb
h below the optimal, in order to take advantage of a lower
spread and then default in period 1 more than bankers were expecting. But if the set H can be
partitioned in J subsets Hj, each one with a suﬃciently high cardinality, and such that the agents
belonging to the same partition have highly correlated types,23 this problem can be avoided. The
reason is that since each individual is small relative to the size of his group, the banker’s strategy
can perfectly consist in setting a spread, which can be diﬀerent for each agent, based not on the
announcement of each agent taken separately, but on the proﬁle of announcements across all agents
in the same group. Then each agent’s announcement will have very little impact on the spread,
and we can assume that in equilibrium every agent will choose their optimal ψb
h, with no strategic
consideration whatsoever.24
The main message is that under rule II a nonlinear pricing schedule arises implicitly in each
banker’s strategy, which is not necessarily incentive compatible, but agents choose the ”right”
announcement for their type due to the price-taking hypothesis. In a remarkable paper, Monteiro
and Page [10] established a competitive analogue to the revelation principle, the implementation
principle, and showed that a game between oligopolistic ﬁrms facing a consumer possessing private
information, and where the ﬁrms’ strategy space is the space of all implementable nonlinear pricing
schedules can be reduced to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs.
They also showed that a Nash equilibrium exists for the mixed extension of the later class of games,
but argue that, since the space of product-price catalogs is not a vector space, no equilibrium can
be shown to exist in pure strategies.
Finally, notice that the assumption that δb
0
6= δb00 for b0 6= b00 permits the bankers to have higher
ﬂexibility in spread choice, since they have some degree of market power over the agents, so they
can choose steeper spread functions in their optimal strategy than they would otherwise be able
to do.25 26 27
3.1. A ”Simple” Example. Consider an economy with just one commodity, one state of nature
in period 1, one primitive asset, with price q and return r = 1, one banker, and one consumer with

















= (3,1) for the banker.
23Suppose for example that all academics will face similar default penalties across all states of nature.
24This assumption is by no means diﬀerent than asssuming that agents act as price takers in a simple ﬁnite
dimensional pure exchange economy.
25Monteiro and Page [10] assume that each type utility depends on the identity of the the ﬁrm with which he or
she contracts.
26Without this assumption, the spreads in equilibrium do not have to be the same for all bankers, since diﬀerent
bankers may give diﬀerent subjective probabilities to diﬀerent states of nature, thus regarding the same agent
diﬀerently.
27If, under rule II, the agents of a certain group HJ announce high ψb
s’s, then all bankers will expect to suﬀer a
high level of default in case they lend to these agents, and will choose high spreads even if δb0
6= δb00 for all b0 6= b00.
In fact bankers may end up competing between them to not lend to these agents, leading to γb
h = q, for all b ∈ B









































Since there is only one market in period 1, we can take the normalization p1 = 1. In period 0
there are two markets open, but by Walras law only one is independent, and by homogeneity we





















+ θ1ψ1 − φ1 6 0, θ1 ∈ [0,1]
I totally abstain from presenting the consumer’s best response function, due to its complexity
and size (it would occupy almost an entire page). It is a function with a total of 12 branches, each
one for a diﬀerent combination of q, γ1 and λ1. Although it is continuous, it exhibits kinks in the
passage between diﬀerent branches.
Due to the (relative) simplicity of this example, it must be assumed that the banker does not
extract information from the observation of q, because otherwise this would be all he needs to
determine the value of λ1. Assume that his objective function is Ub = lnxb
0 + lnxb
1.
It can be shown after some equally messy computations, which have to be made branch by
branch due to the non-diﬀerentiability of the above reaction function, that the equilibrium under
negotiation rule I, independently of the true realization of λ1, is such that q = 3 and γ1 > 11
4 ,
implying q − γ1 6 1
4. At such a low indexed asset price neither type wants to sell the indexed
asset, and they are also not interested in buying the primitive asset at such high price. Thus in
this equilibrium ﬁnancial markets vanish and both individuals have to content themselves with
consuming their endowments.
Under rule II, if the agent does not try to behave strategically,28 there are two possible equilib-
riums, but both such that type λ1 prefers not to borrow and the banker chooses in response to an
announcement ψ1 = 0 a spread γ1 > q − 1
4. Type λ
1
in turn announces an intention to sell ψ1 = 7
8
units of indexed asset, and the banker’s reaction to such an announcement is to demand a spread
γ1 = 0. In period 1 type λ
1
will choose θ1 = 4
5, for a total repayment equal to 7
10. We have two pos-
sible equilibrium values for the price q: when the true realization of the agent’s type is λ1, we have
q = 3, and when its true realization is λ
1
we have q = 4
3. So, when the agent is of type λ1, both him
and the banker have the same utility under both rules, simply because the banker does not want to
trade with him. Under rule II, the banker and the consumer are better oﬀ when the consumer is of
type λ
1
, since he can signal that he is a relatively good payer. The consumers utility is improved
































4. Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we prove the following theorem:29
Theorem 4.1. If all agents’ utility functions are concave and strictly monotone in consumption,
if all bankers’ utility functions are concave and monotone, if rank A = P, if λh
s > 0 for all
(s,h) ∈ S ×H, and if βb
s > 0 ∀b ∈ B and ∀s ∈ S, then a pure strategies equilibrium exists for each
realization of λ ∈ Λ, when indexed assets are negotiated according to rule II.
4.1. Truncated Economy. Our proof will be done through ﬁnite dimensional approximations.
We start by truncating the economy, in terms of consumption bundles, asset portfolios, spreads,
and also agent types.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a truncated economy EN as one in which:
28You can consider that instead of one agent there are 1000 exact copies of the same consummer, with types
perfectly positivelly correlated, and multiply also the banker’s endowment by 1000.
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is partitioned into N sub-intervals of equal

























, 1 6 n 6 N, the value


































0l 6 N ∀l ∈ L ∧ xh
sl (λ) 6 N ∀(s,l,λ) ∈ S × L × Λ










p 6 N ∀p ∈ P ∧ ψb
h 6 N ∀b ∈ B
	









 6 N ∀p ∈ P
	









 6 N ∀h ∈ H
	
.
In the truncated economy EN, λh
sN is a random variable with N possible realizations λh
snN, 1 6
n 6 N. Every player in the truncated economy EN will expect λh





























. Let λN = (λh
sN)h∈H
s∈S , let



























. Then the problem of each consumer in

























N × Y h
N : constraints 2.1, 2.5 and 2.6 are satisﬁed
	
.
Note that in this truncated economy we have a ﬁnite number of agents each one with a ﬁnite
number of types. Thus we can look at each type of the same agent in the truncated economy as a
diﬀerent player. As N increases, the number of types tends to a continuum.











































σN(λN|y0) if Dbe = 0
−∞ if Dbe > 0






s(λN)σN(λN|y0), 30 over his feasible space Y b
N × Γb
N.




+ : (p0,q) ∈ ∆L+P−1	
be the set of admissible period 0 prices,
and let Πs (λN) =

(ps (λN)) ∈ RL
+ : pS (λN) ∈ ∆L−1	
be the set of state s ∈ S and matrix λ ∈ Λ
admissible prices.


















































We now consider a generalized game JN for the truncated economy EN, where, in addition to





























and another SNSH ﬁctitious players, one for each state of nature and each realization λnN of the





















We now state and prove several auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. Each banker’s best response correspondence is upper semicontinuous, compact and
convex valued.










is monotone in each γb
h, h ∈ H, for each ﬁxed ψb
h (and under rule II the banker takes ψb
h as given)
thus is simultaneously quasiconcave and quasiconvex in γb
h. The above function is also monotone,
thus quasiconcave and quasiconvex, in each ϕb
p, p ∈ P. Since a function h(x) deﬁned as h(x) =




























is monotonic in each ϕb
p, p ∈ P, and by remark 5.3 in the Appendix, θh
s(λN) is decreasing in γb
h.
Hence, by the same argument above, the functions vb
s are all quasiconcave
 
ϕb,γb
. Then the result
follows immediately from the compacity and convexity of Y b
N × Γb
N.32 
Lemma 4.3. The generalized game JN has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. The agents’ budget sets Bh
N (λN,γh,y0) are compact and convex valued
and their objective functions are continuous in all their choice variables. Hence, their best response
correspondences πh
N (γh,y0,p1) are upper semicontinuous and compact valued. By quasiconcavity
of their objective functions, πh
N (γh,y0,p1) is also convex valued. Similarly, each banker’s best
response correspondence πb
N(y0,γ−b,ψb) is upper semicontinuous, compact and convex valued by
lemma 4.2. The same applies to the best response correspondence π0
N (x0,φ,ϕ) of the period 0
auctioneer and the best response correspondences π
s,λnN
N (xs(λnN)) of all the SNSH second period















31Under rule 1 ψb
h would not be taken as ﬁxed by the banker, but as a decreasing function of γb
h, and thus the
product γb
hψb
h could be not monotone, rendering us unable to guarantee the quasiconcavity of the banker’s objective
function in the spreads.
32Strictly speaking, the banker’s objective function is discontinuous, but a banker can prevent his or her utility
from being equal to −∞ by simply not trading assets at all. For this, he or she only needs to demand suﬃciently
high spreads such that no agent will want to borrow from him or her. If γbh = δbq 6 1, we are guaranteed of this.
So, we can ignore the positive default branch of a banker’s utility function for every N, and we can treat his utility








































7General Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information And Default Penalties 15
upper semicontinuous and compact convex valued. Thus, by Kakutani’s Fixed point Theorem πN









Lemma 4.4. The equilibrium of the generalized game JN constitutes an equilibrium of the trun-
cated economy EN, for N large enough.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Each banker’s period 0 budget constraint holds with equality by construc-






























Also, agents’s period 0 budget constraints must hold with equality, since their utility is strictly










































































































Now, for N large enough, we must have p∗
0lN > 0, ∀l ∈ L, since otherwise every agent would
choose xh
∗
0lN = N, contradicting (4.3). For any N we must also have q∗
pN > 0, ∀p ∈ P, because
if we had q∗
pN = 0 for any p then every agent and banker would choose φh
∗









N > 0, implying that the auctioneer would want to choose q∗
pN =
1, a contradiction. Also, by a classical non-arbitrage argument, no vector z ∈ RP such that
(−q∗
Nz,Az)
0 > 0 with strict inequality for at least one coordinate can exist, since bankers would
demand N units of the primitive assets p such that zP > 0 and supply N units of those with































In every state s of period 1, and for every realization of the matrix λN, the budget constraints each
agent must hold with equality, again because their utility is strictly increasing, and aggregating all
































∀s ∈ S, ∀λN ∈ ΛN.
Since bankers cannot default in equilibrium, because this is incompatible with their utility
maximization, we must have Db
∗









































































s, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN






















6 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN



























, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN























= 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
We cannot have p∗
1slN = 0 for N large enough, since every agent would choose xh
∗
1slN = N, and





















= 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
as we wanted to show. 
For what follows, when we use the expression ”uniformly bounded”, it should be understood as
uniformly bounded with respect to λ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 4.5. (x∗
N)N=1,2,... is a uniformly bounded sequence.

















s1 for each s ∈ S and ∀N. 
Lemma 4.6. (γ∗
N)N=1,2,... is a bounded sequence (from above and from below).
Proof of Lemma 4.6. If γb
∗
hN > δbq∗
N for some N, then agent h would face a negative price on
his or her sale of indexed assets to banker b, so he or she would choose ψb
∗
hN = 0. If γb
∗
hN < 0 for
some N agent b could proﬁt in period zero, at the expense of banker b, by selling him or her N
units of indexed asset at unit price δbq∗
N −γb
∗
hN and purchasing a portfolio of primitive assets with
weights exactly equal to δb, at unit price δbq∗
N. In state s the net promised return would be simply
δbrs
b − δbrs



















N)N=1,2,... is a bounded sequence.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. For each agent h and each N, let δh
∗
N ∈ ∆P−1 denote the relative weights
vector of his or her primitive assets portfolio φh
∗















has a cluster point δh
∗




















is not constant across s, then γb
∗
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banker b, buy c
ξ
hN units of portfolio δh
∗











, with strict inequality for at least one s, a sure proﬁt.

















































































































−∞ for at least one state s.
Even if the consumer sets xh

























+∞, so he or she will suﬀer

































Let Uh(w) denote the value of agent h utility if he or she consumes the total aggregate endowment























































hN, the agent can only proﬁt at the expense of the bankers if
he or she defaults. But then to proﬁt boundlessly he or she would have to default boundlessly
and his or her utility would become negative. If the agent does not default he or she does not






hN go to inﬁnity. Note that in this case
the bankers for which lim
N
ξ∗
bN > 0 are forced to make their short sales of primitive assets go to














for all s. Otherwise in the limit
the banker would be loosing or gaining boundlessly in either period 0 or in some state of nature
of period 1. Then, we can, without loss of generality, replace these sequences by bounded ones,
without aﬀecting any other equilibrium variables.















































N=1,2,... is hence bounded, and since
q∗
N ∈ RP
++ for N high enough, (ϕ∗
N)N=1,2,... is bounded.
Finally, by the bankers’ budget constraints, (ψ∗



















































Proof of Lemma 4.8. Suppose p∗
0lN →
N









+∞. Similarly, if p∗
1slN (λN) →
N













1sl, contradicting the optimality for the (s,λN)
auctioneer in the generalized game JN. Finally, suppose q∗
pN →
N
0 for some p. Then each agent can
ﬁx q∗
pφh
pN = kh > 0, such that φh
pN →
N
+∞ without increasing the expenditure in the purchase
of primitive asset p. Since ap
s > 0 with strict inequality for at least one s, their state s budget
constraints would explode. 
Let µh
∗
N (λN) denote the set of Lagrange multipliers of agent h at his or her optimal solution
in the truncated economy EN. They depend on λN because the agents have, in each state s, a







N=1,2,... is a uniformly bounded sequence.






N=1,2,... is bounded can be shown following
















































N), ∀b ∈ B.
where Lh is the Lagrangian of agent h optimization problem. Then µh
∗















= 0 for all b, then the agent cannot








0N = 0, and since we
have p∗
0wh
0 > 0, q∗  0, and the agent’s period zero constraint must be holding with equality for






















a contradiction, due to lemma 4.8. 
Now deﬁne fN : Λ → Rz (we do not specify z) :























N is uniformly bounded, hence uniformly Lebesgue integrable. And the sequence R
fN (λ)dσ (λ) converges, maybe passing to a subsequence. By Fatou’s lemma, there is a function
f : Λ → Rz such that























N∈N , for almost ev-
ery λ ∈ Λ.
(ii)
R
























is an equilibrium for the economy E. The market clearing conditions hold pointwise, and result
from the fact that the truncated economy EN is in equilibrium for N high enough and (i) above. To














































































Following the same steps as in the proof of lemma 1 in Ara´ ujo, Monteiro and P´ ascoa [3], we










































































































































































































































s (λ) and Dh
∗
s (λ) = 0 if λh
s > µh
∗




































































































































By the same steps in the proof of lemma 3 in Ara´ ujo, Monteiro and P´ ascoa [3], with the slight
diﬀerence that here we also have to make xh
0 = xh
∗




























































h ) = −τ.
Hence τ 6 0, as we wanted to show.
Finally, the optimality for the bankers results immediately from the upper semicontinuity of
their best response correspondence in the limit, since no price tends to zero by lemma 4.8.34
5. Appendix
5.1. Agent’s Individual Choice Problem Analysis. In this Appendix, we derive formally the
agents’ ﬁrst order necessary conditions. The set of ﬁrst order necessary and suﬃcient Kuhn-Tucker
conditions with regard to the asset portfolio and to the repayment rates is (ignoring dependencies













sdσ(λ|y0,λh) − µ0qp 6 0, φh































bdσ(λ|y0,λh) 6 0, ψb













h − µ2s 6 0, θh






∀s ∈ S and a.e. λ ∈ Λ.
where µs, is the state s budget constraint multiplier, i.e., the state s marginal income utility,
s ∈ S, and µ2s is the multiplier of the constraint θh
s 6 1, s ∈ S.




increase, except maybe if the agents are in a corner solution with ψb









is positive, to re-equate it to zero is necessary to decrease
µ0 and (if θh
s > 0) increase µs for every s ∈ S, by transferring more income from period 1 to period
0, that is to say, by selling more indexed assets.36
Remark 5.2. By monotonicity the budget constraint will always hold with equality (µs > 0), and
if θh
s is diﬀerent from 0 and 1 (partial default) we will have ∂L
h
∂θh
s = 0 and µ2s = 0, which implies that
λh
s = µs, equal to the nominal income marginal utility. If θh
s = 0, we have ∂L
h
∂θh
s < 0 and µ2s = 0,
which implies λh
s < µs. If, on the contrary, θh
s = 1, we will then have ∂L
h
∂θh
s = 0 and µ2s > 0, implying
λh
s > µs. By strict monotonicity, and assuming that uh
s is homothetic just to make the graphical
34Remember that none of his or her choices depend on λ.
35The efective one under rule I, and the expected under rule II.
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illustration simple, the income marginal utility µs will strictly monotonically diminish as we move
up along the income expansion path. In this path there will exist a single point satisfying λh
s = µs.
We will denote it by x∗. The lower λh
s is, the further away from the origin the point x∗ will be. All
points at the income expansion path below x∗ are such that λh
s < µs, and vice-versa. Given the
agent’s asset portfolio and given the price vector ps, his or her budget constraint position is solely
determined by his or her repayment rate. Thus, there are three possible alternatives, represented
in ﬁgures 5 (λh
s low), 6 (λh
s intermediate), and 7 (λh
s high). All admissible consumption bundles
are those below the θh
s = 0 budget constraint. The optimal consumption bundle xh
s will always be
located on the income expansion path between these two extreme budget constraints.
Insert ﬁgure 5 here.
Insert ﬁgure 6 here.
Insert ﬁgure 7 here.
With the help of this simple ﬁgures, several basic comparative analysis can be performed: if the
endowment or the portfolio of primitive asset is increased, θh
s is increased; if the debt is increased
θh
s decreases.
Remark 5.3. Combining remarks 5.1 and 5.2, it is immediate that θh
s (λ) is decreasing in the
eﬀective γh
b , for every s ∈ S and λ ∈ Λ, under rule I. Under rule II, this conclusion is also true but
a bit less obvious. When γh
b increases the agent will have less resources available for consumption
in period 0, implying an increase in µ0 and thus, by condition 5.1, the agent will decrease his
purchases of primitive assets and, by the statement in the last phrase in remark 5.2, θh
s (λ) will
decrease. The intuition is very simple: higher spreads represent a contraction in the agent’s budget
set, making him poorer, and poorer consumers will default more, ceteris paribus.
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